Arabized ethnic group, racially Arab but culturally Khurasanian. Ayalon thus observes that even though they had this distinct connection with Khurasan and pride in this, they are described in the sources as being different from Khurasanians.17 In addition, he interprets the abna' as clearly separate from the Arabs. 18 He and others are especially bound to the national character of this clique. Elton Daniel says "they had been able to forge and to maintain the revolutionary coalition by appealing to feelings of Khurasanian particularism and a vague form of shi'ism."19 Crone remarks that "generally, the Abna' were the bodily, as opposed to institutional, descendants of the participants in the revolution"20 and in a later work that "the sources regularly identified Iranians as Abncd'."21 However she does allow that the abnd' were not wholly "Iranian" or "Arab" but that they were a mixture.22 Jacob Lassner argues that there is a clear connection between "the abna' and Khurasan and, hence, a link between the abni' and the Turks" and that the abni' were the "second generation" of Abbasid revolutionaries.23 Crone goes so far as to say "the Abnd~ had been designed as an imperial aristocracy."24 More recently, she has contrasted them with "Tahir's 'ajam [who] were raw Iranians, people who had failed to transcend their local origins by participation in the high culture."25 This all seems fairly straightforward but Ayalon makes three observations that are particularly telling and have been largely ignored:
1. The Abnd' are hardly mentioned before the struggle between Amin and Ma'mtin. Therefore, the period of their formation and taking shape is completely obscure.
2. Never in their history were the Abna' as active as during that struggle. 3. The Abnd' are stationed exclusively, or almost exclusively, in Baghdad. Practically all the information on them in the chronicles, either during the struggle or after it, is confined to that city. 26 TERMINOLOGY As the preceding discussion shows, in the secondary literature the term abnd' has been reified as if it had been in common parlance from the beginning of the Abbasid revolution to signify a group founded on almost nationalistic terms. In reality, as Ayalon has partially admitted, the term does not appear in use in this form before the war between al-Amin and al-Ma'miin. Scholars have assumed that a multiplicity of terms indicate the abnd' al-dawla, which upon examination do not. Crone states that references to them began during the reign of al-Rashid and that "by far the most common term for the Abbasid troops, whatever their Crone picks up the notion that they were the second generation and deploys it with great effectiveness; "The Abbisid Abnr'," 3.
24. Crone, Slaves on Horses, 73. 25. "'Abbasid Abna'," 14. It is unfortunate that Crone chooses to encode this in terms of nationalist identity, because it is not an essentialized thing that al-Ma'mtin's supporters were all "Iranians," Persians, Turks, or anything else. The assertion being made was that they were outsiders to the community.
26. Ayalon, "Military Reforms," 7. Lassner, Shaping, 133-34, states that "the only certain claim that can be made for the abnd', before the great civil war between the brothers, is that they are Baghdadis descended from the KhurSisanis who come to Iraq with the advance of the revolution." generation is ahl khurasan."27 It is generally assumed that the terms, "abnd' rijal al-dawla, baqiyyat rijal al-da'wa, abnd' ahl khurdsdn, abnd' khurasdn, abna' al-jund al-khurasaniyya," are synonyms of abna' al-dawla, without reading carefully to see if they in fact are.28 In the same way that the thirteenth-century Norman rulers of England are often described as English,29 we expect to find the abna' in these terms and so we have. Interestingly, Crone shows how abna' of various groups are not identical and that the term abnd' can indicate a great range of diversity.30 Before proceeding, we should consider these terms and our assumptions about their meanings. A useful place to begin is with a perceived problem with orthography.
Ayalon remarks, "the sources frequently distort abna' to anbar and abnawi to anbari."'31 Other scholars have taken this to be a truism.32 Perhaps Ayalon's desire to see them as a group and this term as referring to the abnd' distracted him. Anbar clearly designates a place and al-Anbari is the nisba for that place. Located approximately sixty kilometers from Baghdad, al-Saff.h ruled from there for five years.33 Of course Ayalon was too careful a scholar to have missed this. What he has done is to assume that the abnc' as a core elite were already in existence. They went where the caliph went and because al-Saff.h had been there with his Khurasanian forces, the term Anbari must therefore be synonymous with Abnawi. Consider that al-Yacqtibi relates: "and while Abti Jacfar was on the pilgrimage, EIsa b. 'Ali received the oath from whomever was from al-Hashimiyya34 and the commanders from al-Anbar ... then Abt Muslim and whoever was present from al-Hashimiyya and the commanders took the oath."35 Before the founding of Baghdad, al-Saffah had been ruling from Anbar and naturally these people are designated as living in and being part of the capital. Also notice that those who are from al-Hashimiyya, where al-Mansuir had ensconced his supporters, are given the nisba Hishimiyya. This designation, as a parallel, indicates that al-Anbari is a correct usage.36 More tellingly, al-Yacqubi in his Kitdb al-Bulddn informs us that the Anbari secretaries were settled in Baghdad.37
Elad notes that the person named, CAbdawayh al-Anbari, is the victim of "a common orthographical error."38 The latter's name should be al-Abndwi, but al-Anbari has been substituted by mistake. However, Elad does not produce an instance where the name is rendered as al-Abnawl.39 Crone manages to produce a case of the latter that occurs after the fourth 38. "Aspects of the Transition," 99 n. 47. 39. In all of the texts to which he refers, the individual's name is given either with the nisba al-anbart or with none. Al-Tabarl, Ta'rikh, 3: 630, clearly rendered as al-anbdrt, p. 1035.7, no nisba is given. Izz al-Din Ibn al-Athir, fitna.40 She also cites a few instances in addition to those cited by Elad which she assumes indicate that he is Abnawi, but which in fact do not.41 The rendering al-Anbari is not an orthographic error. 'Abdawayh is Anbari, "from the city of Anbar." This does not necessarily mean that he is Abnawi. The two terms are not interchangeable, nor can we say that it is merely the slip of a copyist's hand that has rendered him such. It appears far too consistently. If one is going to assume that a deviation has occurred, then the preponderance of the evidence points in the opposite direction, that of al-Abnawi being a mistaken rendering of al-Anbari.
Elad He equates these with the ahl Khurdsdn and thus with the abnd'. He cites three instances in al-Tabari as his evidence. In two of these, the term "shi'a" indicates "partisans" in reference to the ahl Khurdasn, but its use is generic and is not synonymous with abnd' aldawla.57 In the third passage, the ahl Khurdsan are clearly denoted as the ansar and the shi'a of the regime: ".. . ibta'athakum Allah land shi'atan wa-ansdran."58 As before, the terms are used in a generic sense. This usage does not indicate that everywhere we see "shi'a" or "ansdr" we can automatically convert them to mean ahl Khurdsan and therefore abna' al-dawla.59 Elad also mentions an incident occurring in 147/764 under the reign of al-Mansuir where someone says, "O Commander of the Faithful, thirty men from the important ones of the Shica were brought together from those whom you [had] chosen."60 Taken out of context, this might seem to indicate the abnd' al-dawla. However, the comment comes during a dispute over the succession. The text is describing al-Mans~ir's appointment of his heir and the various groups that are intriguing to have their candidate selected.61 Here "shi'a" indicates the partisans in this struggle.62 The assumption is that because the abnd' existed, then all of these terms must have been used to designate them. This is not the case. They are not equivalent with each other or with abna' al-dawla. They do clearly indicate supporters of various components of the Abbasid regime; that much is not subject to debate. However, "abnd' al-dawla" has a much more specific usage. If we start with the supposition that the abnd' had not formed yet, the multiplicity of terms can be easily explained as indicating a diversity of people.
To elaborate further, one cannot deny that the troops of the early Abbasids are overwhelmingly described as being Khurasanian. However, Elad notes quite correctly that 72. Lassner, Shaping, 133. Elad, "Aspects of the Transition," 177, says that the kuttab abnd' al-da'wa were the propagandists for the revolution. On p. 99, based on this selection, he says that they "constituted something of a sect with a unique status (the most outstanding of whom, were, of course, the Barmakids)." How he extrapolates from this to label them a sect is somewhat baffling.
73. al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, 3: 498.5-6; Crone, "The 'AbbSsid Abnr'," 3. Crone notes that the person who was chosen was Yahya b. Khalid b. Barmak, a descendant of one of the revolutionaries. I do not deny that those who claimed to be abni' during the fourth fitna most probably were descended from the "revolutionaries." However, I am arguing that the point at which these individuals began to subscribe to that identity was much later than is assumed. This entry explicitly describes al-Husayn in terms by which he should be labeled as abnd' aldawla, yet he is not. Why not? Why does he receive the label abn•' ahl Khurasdn instead? Did he not support al-Amin? It might be argued that this is a case that shows the terms are equivalent, but consideration in conjunction with the scarcity of usage of the term abnd' aldawla in any significant way renders this unlikely. It is important that we consider that even if the sources we have are not representative, at the very least they are diverse enough that if the terms abnd' and abna' al-dawla were a common identifier for a socially and politically significant group of elite players with close ties to the caliphs and which formed one of the most significant sources of support for the ruling structure, then our texts would reflect that and the terms abnd' or abndi' al-dawla signifying this group would show up more regularly. The prominence of usage at a specific point in time (during the fourthfitna) clearly indicates a shift in terminology and meanings.
Crone points out that for al-Jahiz "it is their residence in the capital and implied political activities there that distinguish them from the Khurasanis. . .
."98 Thus al-Jahiz viewed the main support both for the Abbasid revolution and for al-Ma'min's putsch as coming from Khurasanians, and the term abnd' was one way to distinguish between the two groups. Crone opines that Ayalon's paradigm holds up well, except that "it merely so happens that the fourth civil war caused the term to shrink . .. the term came to be largely synonymous with members of the Harbiyya."99 Crone's solution can be flipped on its head to provide an equally plausible alternative solution. Her argument rests on the existence of the abnd' as a wellformed social and political grouping before the fourthfitna. The mechanisms that are at work during the fourthfitna are ignored. Crone assumes that the abndi' who fought on the side of al-Ma'min would have willingly surrendered their title and status without attempting to counter this. 100 In this paradigm the groups are renamed without impact and without consideration of what that renaming carries with it. Crone observes, "the descendants of Mucdh b. Muslim, a client of B. Dhuhl who was one of the ahl al-dawla, likewise had ties of fosterage with the caliphs, though they are never explicitly characterized as AbnaV."'10 She is using this to contrast with Yahya b. Khalid b. Barmak who was an "Iranian" and "the very first individual to be singled out as" abnd'. 102 As her evidence for this, she cites that he was the man chosen by al-Mahdi to go with al-Rashid on the summer expedition. Again I point to this text with the reminder that Yaihya is noted as a member of abn~' shi'ati and the ahl dawlati.103 He is one of the partisans of al-Mahdi and one of the people of his rule, in a situation that is charged with a fractious struggle over the succession. These ascriptions do not indicate membership in a broader grouping.
97. Ibn Sacd, Biographien Muhammeds, v. 7, part 2, 87. 98. "CAbbisid Abna'," 9; also noted by Lassner, Shaping, 132. 99. "cAbbasid Abne'," 10, citing Ayalon, "Military Reforms," 7ff., 11, and Lassner, Shaping, 134. 100. Seemingly, this also implies that al-Ma'min's army was made up of Arabs, because as Crone puts it, the Arabs already "had a prestigious identity" and had no need to assert their status as participants in the revolution. "CAbbasid Abnae," 10-11, 9: "The descendants of the best known ahl al-dawla mostly did support al-Ma'mln ... so the only offspring of a famed participant in the revolution to be explicitly linked with the Abna' is CAbdallah b. Crone cites Ibn Tayffir's Kitab Baghdad as saying that "their fathers are the ones who conducted the revolution."104 The text clearly says: wa-aba'uhum hum alladhina qadii aldawla/ and their fathers were the leaders of the dawla.105 Again, the claim that they were descendants of the original revolutionaries is not in dispute. In fact, it was precisely this element that gave their claim legitimacy. It is the timing of when and who began to assert the claim that is significant. Ibn Tayftir also relates in the same line that the abnad were the ones who rose up and fought against al-Ma'miin in the fourth fitna. 106 He makes it explicitly clear who the abnd' are: they are the sons of the original supporters in Baghdad who fought against al-Malmlin. Crone seeks to account for the statements of al-Jdhiz, al-Yalqtbi, and Ibn Tayfuir that the abnd' were Baghdadi, by stating that in the Harbiyya quarter "[m]ost of them must have been ethnic Iranians. Because these people predominated in al-Amin's army and the subsequent opposition to al-Ma'miin, they so-to-speak hijacked the term abnd' aldawla, and so a Banawi in the sources is almost always a non-Arab."107 This and the argument that the siege caused the term abnd' al-dawla to narrow make sense, if we accept that the abnt' al-dawla as a category and identity existed long before the fourth fitna and that those residing outside of Baghdad relinquished the title and status without a murmur.
But if this assumption is set aside, we can process all of this information in an alternative way. Crone is partially correct when she makes the observation that "it was their political role which singled them out from everybody else. Collectively, they were abnd' khurasan almuwalladin, people of Khurasdni descent born 'here', i. men. They were staking a specific claim to a place in society, in response to a threat to that place. The collective "abna'" came together as abnd' at this point and not before. It is not necessary to go through all that Crone and others have gone through to explain why the abnd' show up so clearly during the fourth fitna and not before and really not much afterwards. Occam's razor applies. Before, the term ahl Khuriasn had been a more inclusive one. For the elite of Baghdad, in the face of the opposition of al-Ma'mtin, it was prudent, expedient, and necessary to narrow the categories of belonging to exclude his followers. What we see is not just a narrowing in terminology but a paradigm shift. The definitions and terminology are changed to reflect a realignment of forces and groupings. The abnd' al-dawla staked a claim to status as members of the household as original supporters of the regime, but they had to do so in a way that excluded al-Ma'mUn's forces while differentiating themselves from the rabble of Baghdad (the "naked warriors") that al-Amin was arming. In Egypt the call to switch allegiance to al-Macmuin is addressed to the ahl Khurasdn and not to the abnd' aldawla. 112 The abnd' could not use the regional identity of "Khurasaniness" as ahl Khurasan or solely descent from an original supporter; but these, combined with the locality of Baghdad, offered a convenient limiter. Thus they are Khurasanian but different from alMa'mtin's Khurasanians, descendants of the original supporters but different from those supporting al-Ma'mun's new da'wa because they remain faithful to the original da'wa. At the same time, their ties to the dynasty ran deep, unlike the rabble of Baghdad who rose to support al-Amin.
In the ninth century, people, especially the so-called abna', defined their public identity in relation to the "state" (meaning the ruling body) and their fellow members of society and these ascriptions tied them and society together. When the state, in the form of the caliph, was replaced, these identifications had to be renegotiated. In the case of the abnd', the identity formed in response to the threat from the "usurper," al-Ma'mun. They called themselves the abnd' al-dawla as a means of asserting their claim to legitimacy and their attachment to this caliph (al-Amin) in contrast to a competing claim to elite status. I do not deny the existence of ethnic or cultural differences. The question that must be asked is when and if these are relevant to the motivations and activities of people. The determining variables for the abnd' collective identity were physical location in Baghdad and specific ties to the caliph. When they are designated as the abnd', they are clearly and exclusively inhabitants of Baghdad.113 The claim posits position and opposition. In essence: "We are the abnd' al-dawla, the sons of the regime, the legitimate heirs to the original supporters of the regime."114 "As a result of this, we are entitled to our privileged access to the bounty of the regime." "We are not the rabble (the naked warriors) nor are we the newcomers/faithless-ones (sc. Tihir, Harthama b. Acyan, and their forces).""11 The logic appears to be that if "we" are the physical members of the house, then "we" cannot be removed from "our" positions. These individuals chose the identity of the abnd' al-dawla, because it was a claim that they could sustain of physical attachment to the dynasty and to the caliph. Al-Jdhiz quotes one of the abna': "[w]e were brought up by the caliphs and we are the neighbors of viziers. We were born in the courts of our kings and under the wings of our caliphs. We adopted their manners and followed their example. We know nobody else but them and we are known only as their(s) and nobody else's."'20 Here is an explicit claim by an individual, through the medium of al-Jahiz, for inclusion in the entourage of the caliph, stating clearly who and what he and they were. It was an assertion that they occupied a place of power and privilege, of which they could not be dispossessed (even though they eventually were).
Al-Ma'min's new da'wa spelled one thing for the existing power structure, a new dawla. Al-Ma'mun's followers would expect to be rewarded and the elite in Baghdad knew how. In this new paradigm the "abnd' al-dawla" would be superfluous. Also, as with any successful revolution or upheaval of this sort, in the first period the supporters of the old regime bear the brunt of retribution and dispossession until the dust settles. It is only then that the new regime recognizes that it needs the expertise and cooperation of the former members of the old regime. This can explain the process by which the abnd' were brought back into the fold. then ensure that individuals will come fully to the defense of the collective identity that they see as fully constitutive of their selves when they feel that collective identity is threatened. 128
People are multifaceted. The collective identity does not have to be the sole form of identification for the threat to cause baseline tremors in the individual's perception of his or her social reality. I disagree with the notion that it is a purely modern state of affairs that people subscribe, unsubscribe, and resubscribe to group identity based on relationships and changing conditions. How a person self-identifies is determined by the question to which he is responding. A person may answer in one context with a tribal name and in another with a geographical descriptor. We all have fragments of identity that we deploy in response to different situations.129 All around us (metaphorically) are artifacts or tools of identity that we pick up when they are relevant and useful, and discard when they are not meaningful. This does not mean that identities are not strongly held or that they are created out of nothing for purely utilitarian reasons. It means that they are determined by the milieu in which a person is located and how that individual interprets and responds to that context. This is what those who claimed to be the abn-' al-dawla, the sons of the dynasty, were doing. They were picking up an identity-tool, using it and when it was no longer meaningful they put it back down. This nomenclature is not determined by some sort of cynical, manipulative conspiracy directed from a central core for its own gain, as Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and E. J. Hobsbawm might be interpreted as saying. 130 Clearly identities can be and are used and strengthened by political leaders for cynical and manipulative purposes, but it does not necessarily follow that those forces manufacture the building blocks for them.'31 David McCrone makes the point that nationalisms, and I would add all identities, are defined and determined by individuals making conscious or unconscious choices.132 These choices can be and are reinforced by a government using the tools that Anderson describes: maps, a pledge of allegiance, a flag, and language.133 However, at root, their basic strength comes from personal subscriptions. Everyone is distinct and different and knows what he identifies himself as. The trick comes in making the borders of that identity just blurry enough so that he finds a connection with others close enough that they can claim the same identifier and thus a commonality allowing for the perception of shared interests. The blurring can come from above, using the processes that Anderson describes but, most importantly, it comes from within because it serves some specific need or interest. This does not have to be, nor is it likely to be, conscious. The members of a social system make interpretations of their surroundings and of those surrounding them that allow them to be and to accept others as belonging to the same group, which in turn allows each person to proclaim an identity.134 It is through this process that a collective identity is defined and ultimately subscribed to. If the social system that is partially founded upon this collective identity is threatened, this presents a very real threat to the individual's sense of self. If a rupture in the system occurs, one is forced to reassess his place in relation to other members of a collective identity to which they jointly subscribe and the relation of this collective identity to the social system at large. If the rupture is severe enough, the social system begins to break down and members are forced to re-identify in order to find their place within that system. If the collective identity's relevancy or meaning is undermined, people will search for alternative definitions for it; if none can be found, they will search out other forms with which to encode their selves and their social space. This, I suggest, is what occurred with the abnd' al-dawla. They responded to the threat of al-Ma'min and his followers. Many of the elite in Baghdad found interests that they had in common and coalesced into a collective. Part of this involved defining their relationships to the caliph, to the rabble of the capital, to al-Mamtmin's forces, and to each other. As long as their prosperity and position was tied to the caliphate and there was a clear and present threat to their positions, then there was reason and reward in acclaiming themselves the abnd' aldawla tied to al-Amin, but most importantly to the dynasty. Hence they chose the phrase abna' al-dawla and not abnd' al-Amin. Once al-Amin had been removed from power, the collective identity of the abnd' al-dawla had to be redefined or it would pass from usefulness. Each had to acculturate to the new regime and newly redefined roles, which some of them did and were reintegrated. However, they were no longer at the center of power and the designation as members of the abnd' al-dawla no longer held compelling utility. It disintegrated and in its place a host of subsumed identities resurfaced and other choices presented themselves. The individuals discarded the no longer relevant identifier and turned to other alternatives. It would occasionally be used again, but it never held the force or urgency that it had during the fourth fitna.
Being abna' al-dawla was not an essentialized part of their selves, nor had there been time for it to become perceived as such. They could choose to use different terminologies. It was only in the face of al-Ma'miin's forces, which expressly intended to replace them at the center of the Islamic world, that some of the descendants of the Abbasid revolutionaries began to define themselves as the sons of the dynasty, and in the process excluded al-Ma'mtin's followers from the category. Once the threat had been fulfilled, new identities were necessary and old ones that had been subsumed were allowed to resurface. The collectivity, made up of individuals who had come together to form the abnd' al-dawla, splintered into its constituent parts based on preexisting, underlying knowledges of self. What had become the second tier of identification rose again to the forefront and returned to being primary motivators for collective action, based on different criteria. The abna' al-dawla supra-identity had been asserted to fulfill a specific defensive need. This is not to say that it was false, but that it was "imagined" and the materials that were available were used once they became relevant and useful. Before, they had not been relevant, nor were they afterwards. The threat posed by al-Ma'mlin caused the abni' to coalesce as a collective, but their interests and ties of loyalties were too diffuse to maintain it once the compelling reasons to identify as such were removed. It was not a group present from the beginning of Abbasid rule, bound by a sense of ethnic or national ties. It was the subscription to an identity by a group of military supporters of the Abbasid caliphate based in Baghdad, claiming special ties of loyalty to that caliphate and the caliphal household, intended to supersede the claim that could be made by al-Malmun's forces. It was a claim driven by a threat to position within a social system. Once the cause was lost, al-Amin defeated (and dead) and their positions assumed by al-Ma'miin's followers, then it was politically and economically difficult to sustain solidarity in an identity that had lost its relevance and meaning. The abni' fractured, disintegrated and, after a period of social renegotiation of power roles, the individuals began to coalesce around the new caliph and their identities were reconstituted and adapted.
